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A B S T R A C T
The aim of this paper is to identify the key factors that lie behind venture
capital/private equity fundraising in countries where there is scarce and asymmetric
information about final returns. The main contribution of this paper is to explain
fundraising by means of variables directly related to the venture capital process rather
than by macroeconomic ones. We use panel data techniques on data from 16 European
countries during the nineties. In the light of the long period required for investing
committed capital and the illiquid nature of investments until the fund is divested, the
focus is placed on the investing capabilities  of  fund managers. We find that the
amounts invested in the previous year have a positive and significant impact on
fundraising. In this sense, the market would be regarding the ability of fund managers to
invest the total amounts investors have previously committed.








The term venture capital does not have quite the same meaning for European firms
as it does for Americans. In the United States, it is linked to equity, or equity–related
investments in start-ups, or in companies involved in high growth cycles. It was
introduced in the 1940s as an alternative long-term option to allocating money in the
official stock markets. Specialised investment vehicles, such as limited partnerships or
Small Business Investment Companies (SBCIs), were devised to develop a professional
approach to portfolio management. Since its introduction, hundreds of thousands of
companies have benefited from this long-term financial facility, reducing the probability
of an early failure due to a lack of liquidity during their start-up processes, and thus,
accelerating their growth patterns.
Apart from a few exceptions, most venture capital investors started operating in
Europe in the 1970s. Since the mid-1980s, however, the lack of an adequate
environment has caused their withdrawal from early-stage investments. The bulk of
their activity has been devoted to buy-outs and other later-stage investments. As a
result, most investors feel more comfortable with a different label on their operations:
Private Equity. European statistics, on the other hand, refer to private equity as a more
general concept that includes any commitment to unquoted companies, at any stage,
from seed investments to replacements, buy-outs and turn-around operations.
Despite such differences in concept, however, in both the United States and
Western Europe, a similar approach is used with regard to the investment vehicles
employed. Since the 1980s, limited partnerships and close-end funds have accounted for
75 to 80 percent of the total funds under management in most countries. These funds
have a limited lifespan, generally from 8 to 12 years, and are managed by independent
teams who charge an annual fee on committed capital and get a 20 to 25 percent reward
on the capital gains generated when the money is paid back to the investors.
Considering the specific characteristics of these funds, the purpose of this paper is
to demonstrate that investments and divestments are the key factors that explain the new
funds raised into this field in a developing private equity market. The scope of our study
covers 16 Western European countries, during the period 1991-1999. We use panel data
to regress the independent variables selected. Other developed countries were excluded
from the survey in order to test the importance of the above-mentioned variables in data
taken from different economies that follow a similar economic pattern. Although some
relevant differences still exist between the sizes and stages of development among the
markets selected, all of the data used here has been homogenised, using the GDP figure
of each nation.
Several papers that have dealt with venture capital fundraising have attempted to
discover the main forces that lie behind such activities. Most of them have focussed on
issues that are related to external factors, such as gross domestic product (GDP) growth,
capital-gains taxes, initial public offerings (IPOs)1, market capitalisation, accounting
procedures, legislation of pension funds, and so on. This paper focuses on a different
approach by stressing the importance of topics that are more related to how this industry
                                                
1 Sometimes taking venture-backed IPOs into account.3
works in countries where there is little information available on the final returns of such
investments. The main aim of this paper, therefore, is to demonstrate the importance of
such aspects as significant variables that explain the flow of money into the private
equity industry. At the same time, it tries to answer the question raised by Gompers and
Lerner (1998), on how the venture capitalists in such countries overcome their lack of
reputation.
The paper is structured as follows. The following section surveys the different
approaches to venture capital and private equity fundraising in the economic literature,
identifying the main factors signalled by their different authors. Section 3 describes how
money raised for private equity is managed. Our view on the matter is that there are
certain aspects of the process that should be considered as relevant variables, with
explanatory content, of the fundraising activities in a growing market. Section 4
discusses the structure of the model, explaining the variables included, the data, and the
methodology. Section 5 includes the results obtained on the different specifications
tested and summarises our main findings. The results are interpreted in the context of
the characteristics and stage of development of the European private equity industry
during the nineties. Section 6 concludes and proposes new developments for future
research.
2.  FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE FLOW OF VENTURE CAPITAL AND
PRIVATE EQUITY
It is not an easy task to analyse the factors that determine both the amount of capital
available for investments in unquoted companies and the amounts allocated to such
companies by professional investors. Furthermore, there are significant differences
between the structures and stages of development of venture capital and private equity
in different countries. The diversity of investment vehicles, sources of funds, portfolio
management approaches, the sizes and stages of development of the investing
companies and so on, are cited by Jeng and Wells (2000) as the main causes for such
differences. As a result, fundraising and investment processes tend to follow separate
patterns in different countries, thus limiting the possibility of finding relevant
conclusions when it comes to identifying the key aspects that affect them. Furthermore,
with the exception of the United States, relevant data has only been available in most
other countries since the mid-eighties, and just on a yearly basis. On the other hand,
many of the factors are not easy to measure. Proxy variables are often used to cope with
this problem.
The list of factors that have been studied, in economic literature, are Initial Public
Offerings (IPOs), returns to investors, capital gains taxation, regulation of pension
funds, the growth of market capitalisation, returns on investments in quoted companies,
the rigidity of the labour market and the reliability of accounting procedures.
Among these characteristics, IPOs have been mentioned as one of the most
important factors that positively influence the raising of new venture capital funds
(Black and Gilson, 1999; Berlin, 1998; Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Jeng and Wells,
2000). As Black and Gilson point out, the existence of a well-developed stock market
that permits exits through an IPO is critical to the existence of a vibrant venture capital4
market. In fact, they found a significant relationship between the number of venture-
backed IPOs and new capital commitments to venture capital funds in the following
year. Berlin (1998) also found that new funds enter the venture capital market when the
IPO market is hot.
Exiting through an IPO is good for all the agents who participate in the venture
capital process. On the one hand, the entrepreneur may get additional financing through
the issuance of new stock and, simultaneously, recover a great portion of the effective
control of the firm. On the other hand, IPOs are one of the most profitable means of exit
for venture capitalists. The volume of IPOs would then affect not only the supply of
venture capital but its demand as well (Jeng and Wells, 2000).
A Venture Economics (1988) study found that a $1 investment in a firm that went
public provided an average cash-return of $1.95 in excess of the initial investment, with
an average holding period of 4.2 years. The next best alternative, divestment through a
trade sale, yielded a cash-return of just 40 cents over a 3.7-year average holding period.
In a study of the Canadian Venture Capital Association, Amit et al. (1998) found that
IPOs are relatively profitable, compared with other forms of divesting. As investments
are made in situations where informational asymmetries are important, exits would take
place basically through sales to informed investors, and venture capitalists would only
present good-quality ventures in public offerings.
A company’s performance also has a positive effect on fundraising (Gompers and
Lerner, 1998). For these authors the market value of equity held by venture capitalists in
firms that go public is highly correlated with returns on venture funds. In this way, they
show that increases in IPO market activity are followed by increases in fundraising,
which is the same evidence that Black and Gilson (1999) found for performance and
IPOs. Gompers and Lerner also say that the reputation of the venture capital firm2 may
influence positively the flow of new commitments when it raises a new fund. Older and
larger venture capital firms are supposed to have more established reputations, so they
may receive larger capital commitments than similar younger firms.
The impact of capital gains taxation has also been examined in the literature.
Poterba (1989) found that a decrease in the capital gains tax rate might increase
commitments to venture capital funds through an increase in the demand for venture
capital3. This relationship is more reliable than the one based on the supply of venture
capital. Gompers and Lerner (1998) argue that if changes in this tax rate affect the
demand for venture funds, a capital gains tax decrease would increase the capital
committed by both tax-exempt and tax-sensitive investors. They also found evidence of
the link between capital gains tax rate and commitments through the demand side. If the
effect was due to the supply side only capital committed by tax-sensitive investors
would increase.
This relationship between the capital gains tax rate and new funds raised has not
only been found for countries in which venture capital is well developed, but also in
countries where the venture capital experience is much more limited. Aylward (1998)
found that, in China, new venture funds raised in 1995 proved, for the fourth
                                                
2 Measured by age and capital under management.
3 More people become entrepreneurs.5
consecutive year, to follow a steeply rising investment trend, as investors continued to
take advantage of business opportunities and significant tax incentives.
Another variable that may considerably affect commitments to venture funds is the
level of pension funds in the economy, provided that they are allowed to invest in
venture capital. As great sums of money are managed by pension funds, their
involvement affects the supply of venture capital (Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Jeng and
Wells, 2000). This variable is of great importance for certain countries, like the United
States. When the “prudent man rule” was modified, new commitments to venture
capital rose sharply. This is not the case in most European countries, where pension
funds do not manage such large sums of money and/or do not have the habit of
investing in unquoted companies.
There are other macroeconomic factors that may affect both the supply and the
demand for venture capital. Gompers and Lerner (1998) argue that if an economy is
growing, there may be more opportunities to start new firms, which will increase the
demand for venture capital funds. More specifically, gross domestic product (GDP)
growth, attractive returns in the stock market and greater research and development
expenditures may increase the demand for venture capital. However, increases in
interest rates may also lead to a decrease in the supply of venture capital, as investment
in loans is an alternative asset class to venture capital and private equity. Jeng and Wells
(2000) have also studied the macroeconomic variables of GDP growth and market
capitalisation growth. They believe that these two variables affect both the demand and
the supply of venture capital.
Aylward (1998) found some evidence of this in the case of developing countries as
well. In Central and Eastern Europe, there was a surge in the capital committed to
venture funds during 1994 and 1995, when the prospects for economic stability in the
region improved.
Furthermore, many of the papers we surveyed included some  environmental
variables, such as the efficiency of bankruptcy procedures, market confidence in
financial reporting standards and labour market rigidities. Jeng and Wells (2000) cited
the efficiency of bankruptcy procedures, but it was not included in their empirical
analysis because they encountered difficulties in finding good measures for it. Jeng and
Wells (2000) also argued that if the market relies on information on start-up firms (with
good accounting regulations), the venture capitalists will require less time to gather the
information needed to monitor their investments. This will ultimately reduce the
financing burden through a decrease in the cost of asymmetric information. This will
influence both the demand and the supply of venture capital funds.
Labour market rigidities and differences in labour market regulation might well be
a hindrance to venture capital activity. Jeng and Wells (2000) argue that the more rigid
the labour market is, the more difficult it will be to an individual who has failed in his
venture to find new employment. Such labour market rigidity will thus negatively affect
venture capital activity, and the effect will be seen through the demand for venture
capital. For Black and Gilson (1999), restrictions on lay-offs impose costs on start-up
businesses and this could lower the birth rate of new companies. In Germany, for
example, where there is greater protection against lay-offs, there is little venture capital6
available, while in Britain and the United States, where labour markets are more
flexible, there is greater venture capital activity.
Labour market rigidities, however, cannot be the only reason that explains why a
country has so little venture capital available. Countries like Ireland and Israel, for
instance, have restrictions that are comparable to the ones of West Germany, and yet
they have relatively strong venture capital markets. Black and Gilson (1999) argue that
one of the reasons that these markets are so strong is that they have access to the British
and the United States stock markets respectively, in which they can exit their
investments through IPOs.
Given the general benefits to the economy of venture capital activity (Barry, 1994;
Fried and Hisrich, 1994), or more specifically, its impact on innovation (Kortum and
Lerner, 1998) it is recommended to conduct further research on the key aspects that
affect venture capital fundraising. In this sense, a limited flow of capital into the
industry would limit the birth rate of new firms in a given country. As Gompers (1998)
argues, however, too many funds raised may affect the pricing of transactions, and thus,
the returns on investments (“too much money chasing too few deals”).
3.  INSIGHT ON HOW PRIVATE EQUITY CAPITAL IS MANAGED
Around 75 percent of new funds raised yearly in developed countries go to limited
partnerships or close-end funds (Venture Economics, 1993-2000; EVCA, 1989-2000).
Such funds are set up by experienced general partners, or independent management
companies, who attract institutional, corporate and private investors.
Since money is placed in unquoted companies, the venture capital/private equity
investment process requires 8 to 12 years to mature, from the initial investment to the
liquidation of the fund. During the years of this process, investors are unable to exit the
fund and receive the proceeds gradually from divested portfolio companies. The final
return on their investment is only available to them when the last investment has been
sold. Until such time, only the expected returns are available, based on real divestments
and interim valuations of unquoted portfolio companies.
In mature venture capital markets, investors are attracted to the field by past
performance. More precisely, interested investors try to find the best management team
for their money, basing their decision on the track record accredited to them in previous
funds. Such information, however, is only available in countries like the United States,
where many management teams have closed their participation in a great number of
funds.
In economies were private equity is still a young industry, past performance is
obviously limited and/or unavailable at times. In such cases, divestments at cost are a
proxy variable that anticipates good or bad returns. As has already been stated above,
IPOs are usually correlated with good returns in individual investments. An increasing
number of IPOs, therefore, is considered to be a sign that money is going back to the
investors and there is an increase in the expected return on the average portfolio.7
In such countries, furthermore, there are always new players every year, all trying
to raise their first fund, in addition to new investors accessing the private equity market
as limited partners. A short-term signal to new investors is the availability of enough
investment opportunities. In order to understand how this situation arises, we must
examine the private equity investment process4.
As a general rule, when investors join a new fund, they sign a commitment, but
they are not required to disburse the money until a given investment is approved. The
representatives of these investors form the investment committee. Each investment
proposal is either approved or rejected by this committee. Once a given proposal has
been approved, the fund managers request each of the investors included in the fund to
supply his share of the investment capital required.
The fund managers draw an annual fee from the fund’s resources, usually in the
range of 2-3 percent of the capital committed (Gladstone, 1983; Sahlman, 1990). They
also receive a reward5 based on the amount of capital gains returned to the investors
after management fees and other legal expenses have been deducted. The management
fee is charged yearly based on the global commitment. However, it might well take up
to three years to be able to invest a significant amount of the committed capital.
The management team first activates a deal flow, then starts screening investment
proposals. On average, just 3 out of 10 cold contacts imply some further interest in the
applicant company. The companies selected are then asked to provide a comprehensive
business plan, including a description of the company, product, market and management
team, as well as the required funding and a destination for it.
According to the focus of the fund, venture analysts then assess the interesting
aspects of the proposal, the experience and confiability of the company managers, the
size of the market and the uniqueness of the product/service. In the event of all of these
criteria being met, the two parties then begin to negotiate the price and the structure of
the deal. If an agreement is reached, the operation is then presented to the investment
committee for approval. Once it has been approved, the fund managers and the
representatives of the investing company sign a letter of intend, outlining all of the
points agreed on.
The next step, which usually requires a minimum of two weeks, is referred to as a
time of due diligence, when the fund managers conduct a detailed research on the
company’s assets, liabilities, contracts, accounting procedures and so on, before the
investment is disbursed.
In the final step, shareholders from the investee company sign the issuance, or sale,
of the shares and the agreements to protect the rights of the new shareholders, who
usually hold a minority stake.
The entire process rarely takes less than 4 weeks to complete and can sometimes
take up to 6 months. The average duration is between 12 and 16 weeks (Martí, 1997-
                                                
4 Among others, Gladstone (1988), Sahlman (1990) and Gompers and Lerner (1999) offer complementary
approaches on this issue.
5 This is known as carried interest and amounts to between 20 and 25 percent of net capital gains to investors, once
the original amounts committed have been capitalised at a minimum rate, known as a hurdle rate.8
2000). This is quite different from managing a mutual fund, in which case, with a
simple phone call a manager could immediately allocate important sums of money to
financial instruments quoted in official markets.
Furthermore, it must be remembered that several venture investors might well be
analysing the same business plan and negotiating with the same entrepreneurs. The
implication of such a situation is that a given management team could be involved in
several proposals at the same time, and end up without having any investment disbursed
at all. Considering the fact that the investors are charged a yearly management fee based
on their global commitment, it would be extremely difficult for the management team to
explain why they were not able to close a single deal.
Once the investments have been disbursed, fund managers then join the boards of
the investee companies in order to add value to them and keep a close watch on their
evolution. They provide valuable advice and add credibility in an effort to increase the
probability of success.
Considering the fund’s portfolio as a whole, it is well known that lemons show up
much earlier than pearls do, and it therefore does not take the investors very long to
realise which of the portfolio’s companies are failing. The success stories take a longer
time to materialise. Some companies might stick to what the business plan had
originally anticipated, but might finally fail to meet expectations at the time of
divestment. As a result, it could well take between 8 and 10 years to be able to guess
which the real returns for the investors in a limited partnership or close-end fund will
finally be.
Since all investments are illiquid, realising the stakes held in private equity
portfolio companies is somewhat different to selling shares from a mutual fund’s
portfolio. While mutual funds may sell their portfolios in official markets, private equity
investors must divest their shares in each company individually.
The available exit ways are IPO, trade sale to a third party, sale to the owners or
managers and liquidation. The type of exit chosen depends on the evolution and the
characteristics of the portfolio company and, of course, the constraints imposed by the
environment. In the United States, the availability of a remarkable domestic market,
plus the existence of the NASDAQ, is the key to the popularity of IPOs as the most
common exit way (Venture Economics, 2000). Such conditions, together with fiscal
transparency for private equity investors and the absence of administrative barriers for
new entrepreneurs, explain the different degrees of development between the United
States venture capital field and those of most European countries (Martí, 1997-2000).
Trade sales are a good alternative, especially in the case of strategic buyers, and a
managers/owners buy-back is only seen in the case of companies that do not meet the
expectations detailed in the original business plan.
Since the proceeds obtained from divestments are given back to the fund investors
and the fund itself will disappear within 8 or 10 years, private equity management teams
are forced to raise new capital regularly. Taking into account the investment process
described above, a given fund is fully invested6 in about 3 years. From that moment
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onwards, the management team will not be able to participate in new deals unless a new
fund is raised with fresh money ready to be invested. Activities in the fully invested
fund will consist of adding value and, in some cases, participating in a second or third
round of financing portfolio companies. The aim of such a process is to seek an exit at a
rewarding return as soon as both the company and the market are ready for divestment.
To sum up, therefore, in order to cover the full range of private equity activities,
from investing to divesting, professional fund managers must raise new funds every 2 to
3 years.
4.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This section concentrates on the key aspects that determine the interest of investors
in new funds in European countries. The difference between this paper and previous
ones that have dealt with fundraising is its focus on data related to the private equity
investment cycle, as an alternative to the explanatory power of macroeconomic or
environmental variables.
The aspects to be examined are the influence of both investments and divestments
on the decision to join a new private equity fund. As stated above, divestments through
IPOs have proven to be a variable that is positively related to new funds raised. Since
only the best companies will be accepted by the stock markets, IPOs signal liquidity
plus good performance. Nevertheless, the lack of developed stock markets for growth
companies in Europe limits the relative importance of venture-backed IPOs. In fact,
trade sales are the most common way of exiting in Europe as a whole7 (EVCA, 1989-
2000). Under such an environment, the flow of money divested is the only signal of the
anticipated return at the closing of the fund’s life.
Since it may take as many as 5 years for a fund to start divesting its shares in
portfolio companies, an estimated track record is not available for most investors in
countries were the private equity market is still developing. But the managers must start
new fundraising processes before they can show a track record on liquidated funds.
Another proxy variable for assessing the quality of the management team is the
amount invested in the on-going funds. Closed deals imply good access to a sufficient
deal flow and a demonstration of negotiating capabilities when competing with other
market players. It must be remembered that, as fund managers charge an annual fee on
the fund’s total resources, investors would not be happy if the amounts finally invested
are not sufficient to justify the fees charged on committed capital.
The models proposed here are aimed at explaining the fundraising pace in European
countries in the nineties, on the basis of both investments and divestments. The study is
based on panel data gathered from the European Union member countries, excluding
Luxembourg, plus Norway and Switzerland, during the period 1991-1999. The length of
the period was limited by the availability of relevant data, as EVCA studies that were
done prior to 1991 did not offer a breakdown of divestments.
                                                
7 In fact, even the amount of written-off investments surpassed the amount divested through IPOs, valued at cost,
until 1993.10
The independent variables include the total amounts invested in and divested from
private equity operations, as well as the amounts divested through IPOs and write-offs8,
all of which are valued at cost. In addition to those industry-related variables, a further
macroeconomic variable, GDP growth, is also included. Data on fundraising,
investments and divestments were taken from 1989 to 2000 EVCA Yearbooks for all
countries, except in the case of Spain, where the source was the database maintained by
José Martí from the Universidad Complutense de Madrid9. All divestments were valued
at cost. The series of GDP data of each country was gathered directly, in local currency,
from each official statistics institution.
The information available included data from all countries for the full period 1991-
1999, except in the case of countries like Austria, Denmark, Germany, Greece and
Switzerland. The lack of certain values implied the exclusion of the period 1991-1994
in the case of Austria, 1993 in the case of Denmark, 1991-1992 in the case of Germany,
1991-1994 in the case of Greece and 1995 in the case of Switzerland.
In order to make data more homogeneous, all variables related to the private equity
industry, expressed in local currency, were normalised by the observed GDP figure of
the year in local currency as well. This adjustment seems to be useful and needed for at
least two reasons. First, since countries differ in economic levels and each one has a
different economic growth, the well-known problem of heteroskedasticity may arise,
that is, the greater the economic level, the higher the observed variability. So,
normalising data by GDP allows us to cope with this problem. Second, all variables are
originally expressed in nominal terms, so an observed increase over time in a variable
could exclusively be due to an increase in price levels. Therefore, different inflation
rates among countries could bias the estimated parameters. Normalising variables by
GDP imposes a kind of deflation, since GDP also incorporates the effect of inflation in
each country. This is an alternative procedure that seems to be more advantageous than
the one used in Jeng and Wells (2000). In this paper, the authors divide each
observation with the mean value of GDP over time.
Figure 1 describes how new funds raised vary among countries during the period
1987-1999, highlighting the difference in the stage of development of the private equity
market in the United Kingdom. We can observe that almost every country shows an
upward tendency on this variable. The better knowledge of the market on the ability of
fund managers could be causing this pattern. This increasing trend observed on new
funds raised in most of the countries recommended the introduction of a further
variable, the variable Trend in tables 2 and 3, to identify increases in fundraising
activities in real terms.
                                                
8 The introduction in the same regression of  divestments through IPOs and write-offs along with total amounts
divested is not supposed to introduce collinearity between regressors as none of them account for more than thirty
percent of total divestments.
9 He has been managing the Spanish Private Equity Survey, on behalf of the Spanish Private Equity Association
(ASCRI) since 1985 and publishes a yearly survey. He has also been providing Spanish data to the EVCA Yearbook
since 1991.11
FIGURE 1
NEW FUNDS RAISED IN 16 EUROPEAN COUNTRIES DURING 1987-1999
(Normalised by the GDP figure)
0.0040.0060.0080.010.012
1 Austria 3 Denmark 5 France 7 Greece 9 Ireland 11 Norway 13 Spain 15 Switzerland
2 Belgium 4 Finland 6 Germany 8 Holland 10 Italy 12 Portugal 14 Sweden 16 United Kingdom
Table 1 shows the differences among countries, based on the averages of funds
raised in relation to GDP, as well as the standard deviations and variations, from
minimum to maximum values of funds raised, compared to GDP. There is a huge
difference between the minimum average of new funds raised, normalised by GDP, in
Austria ( 0.025) and the maximum accounted for in the United Kingdom (0.41).
Nevertheless, averages in most countries are not far from the median of the value for the
entire group, which stood at 0.07 percent.12
TABLE 1





Austria 0.025% 0.033% 0.001% 0.093%
Belgium 0.085% 0.085% 0.022% 0.331%
Denmark 0.030% 0.029% 0.001% 0.093%
Finland 0.110% 0.159% 0.004% 0.516%
France 0.128% 0.085% 0.065% 0.318%
Germany 0.060% 0.064% 0.011% 0.234%
Greece 0.037% 0.025% 0.013% 0.069%
Holland 0.146% 0.133% 0.037% 0.432%
Ireland 0.135% 0.122% 0.024% 0.402%
Italy 0.054% 0.042% 0.018% 0.160%
Norway 0.070% 0.089% 0.000% 0.337%
Portugal 0.072% 0.063% 0.008% 0.219%
Spain 0.054% 0.036% 0.012% 0.132%
Sweden 0.175% 0.175% 0.015% 0.471%
Switzerland 0.054% 0.063% 0.011% 0.247%
United Kingdom 0.405% 0.274% 0.151% 1.052%
Concentrating now on the impact of investments on fundraising activities, Figure 2
highlights the positive relationship between new funds raised in a given year, for each
of the 16 selected countries10, and private equity investments lagged one period. The
reason why investments were lagged one period is consistent with the moment when the
information about new funds raised, investments and divestments is disclosed, which is
June of the following year.
                                                
10 It should be noted that the anomalous observation on the right hand side of each chart refers to the United
Kingdom.13
FIGURE 2
NEW FUNDS RAISED RELATED TO INVESTMENTS LAGGED ONE PERIOD
(Normalised by the GDP figure in local currency for each country)
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The panel data methodology was employed, as data on cross-sectional time series
was available. In this context, the use of the panel data methodology offers several
advantages. The more immediate one is that it allows a more efficient handling of data
than individual cross-section or time series analyses when we have panels of data.
Nevertheless, the main advantage is that it allows controlling for the effects of variables
that specifically affect the dependent variable of each country but are unobservable (the
so-called individual heterogeneity). There are relevant factors like, for example,
entrepreneurship or cultural, sociological, environmental ones that are different for each
country (but constant in time) and can be causing a different effect on the dependent
variable. The problem is that these variables are very difficult to measure and the
omission of these variables leads to bias in the resulting estimates. The data panel
methodology allows controlling for this individual heterogeneity. For a more detailed
study of issues related to panel data, see Hsiao (1986) and Arellano and Bover (1990).
The panel data regression is based on the following model:
   ititit yxu ab=++
  i=1, 2,…,N  ;  t=1, 2,…,T
with i denoting individuals (the cross section dimension) and t denoting time (the time
series dimension). We denote 
it x
 as the itth  observation on K explanatory variables.
The random disturbance is modelled in terms of a one-way error component model, i.e.,
itiit uv h =+
where 
i h
 denotes the unobservable individual specific effect and 
it v
 denotes the
underlying disturbance, which can be thought of as a zero-mean white noise process.
Some papers have discussed whether the individual effects are treated as fixed or
random variables.  However, this is not an important distinction because we can always
treat the individual effects as random variables without loss of generality (Arellano and
Bover, 1990). What is really important it is to determine whether these individual
effects are correlated with the observed  variables x it or not. To test for the existence of
this correlation we used the Hausman test (1978). If the Hausman test does not reject
the null hypothesis that the individual effects are not correlated with the explanatory
variables, the most suitable estimation would then be the random-effects model. As in
all the regressions we ran, the Hausman test did not reject the null hypothesis, we
treated the specific effects as being  random and applied the Balestra Nerlove (1966)
estimator, which is the most efficient one in this case.
5.  RESULTS AND FINDINGS ON THE FUNDRAISING PROCESS
The first model regresses new funds raised against total amounts invested and
divested, plus the volume of venture-backed IPOs during the same year. This latter
variable is also included, as it has been in other papers related to fundraising activities.
As shown in Table 2, investments was the only significant variable. As it was expected,15
its coefficient is positive, which means that high levels of investments will lead to more
fundraising. Although it is non-significant, it should be noted that the negative
coefficient of divestments is striking. Nevertheless, it could be explained by the
negative performance in a substantial number of divestments11. As expected,
divestments through IPOs did not have a significant impact on fundraising activities in
the group of countries analysed.
TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF RESULTS (Random effects)
Dependent variable: New funds raised
Independent
Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
(1)  INVit 1.001
* - - - - -
(10.17)
(2)  DIVit -0.003 - - - - -
(-0.29)
(3)  DIVIPOit 0.644 - - - - -
(0.88)






(10.06) (10.71) (10.62) (9.89) (9.79)






(-1.90) (-2.35) (-2.32) (-2.32) (-2.30)
(6)  DIVIPOit-1 - -0.042 0.267 0.255 -0.125 -0.128
(-0.04) (0.31) (0.30) (-0.15) (-0.15)
(7)  DIVLIQit-1 - - -4.295
* -4.308
* -2.385 -2.372
(-2.78) (-2.76) (-1.50) (-1.47)
(8)  DGDPit - - - -6.054E-4 - -9.98E-5
(-0.20) (-0.03)





*** 2.76E-5 1.323E-4 1.666E-4 -9.955E-4
* -9.932E-4
**
(1.81) (0.19) (0.97) (0.75) (-2.73) (-2.41)
















GLS regression of 16 countries of the model 
' ; ititititiit yxuuv abh =++=+
, with i denoting
country and t denoting year. The dependent variable is new funds raised. The independent variables are
(1) Total amount invested (2) Total amount divested (3) Total amount divested through IPOs (4), (5) and
(6) are the same as (1), (2) and (3) respectively, lagged one period (7) Total amount divested through
write-offs lagged one period (8) Growth in GDP from "t-1" to "t" (9) Deterministic time trend. All
regressors except T have been normalised by variable GDPit. t-statistics in parenthesis.
* = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, *** = significant at 10%
                                                
11 As already stated, on taking into account the amount divested, until 1993 write-offs out-paced IPOs in Europe as a
whole, being the second exit mechanism. This situation lasted until 1997 when the number of divestments was
computed.16
Since aggregated information about funds raised, investments and divestments is
only available in June of the following year, all specifications from the second onwards
were lagged by one year. The coefficient on investments rose to 1.69, being significant
at the 1 percent level, while divestments repeated a larger negative coefficient, being
significant only at the 10 percent level.
In order to explain the negative weighting of divestments, a new variable was
included: the amount of investments written-off lagged one year. As a result,
investments, divestments and write-offs showed significant coefficients. The coefficient
on investments was again positive. As expected, the estimated coefficient for write-offs
was negative, which helps to explain the negative value observed in the case of total
divestments.
As has been done in other papers, a further specification included GDP growth.
Table 2 shows limited changes in both coefficients and R-squared. One relevant result,
in our model, is that GDP growth is not statistically significant. This is contrary to the
arguments of Gompers and Lerner (1998)  who find that increases in the real GDP
growth in the previous year12 lead to greater commitments to venture funds. It is
consistent, however, with the arguments of Jeng and Wells (2000) who find that GDP
growth is not statistically significant.
The fifth model eliminated this latter variable, as it was not significant, and
included a deterministic time trend. The results show that coefficients estimated are
slightly lower, but with the same sign, than  those in the fourth specification, the
coefficient on Trend being significant. Although the amounts written-off are now not
significant, they nevertheless have the same sign as before.
The last specification included both Trend and GDP variables, with irrelevant
changes in the coefficients regressed and in their t-statistics.
Therefore, the amounts invested in the previous year showed a positive effect on
new funds raised, with a coefficient in the region of 1.69 to 1.86 in all of the proposed
specifications, all significant at the 1 percent level.
Investors in European markets tend to assess private equity as an alternative asset
class, depending on the ability of management teams to find suitable investment
proposals. The explanation of this statement lies in the characteristics of the private
equity investment process and its vehicles. Firstly, there is a need to have access to a
sufficient deal flow, so that each investment proposal must be screened before the
negotiation starts, thus competing with other investors. Finally, when an agreement is
reached between both parties, a detailed due diligence process is developed before the
deal is closed and money is then disbursed. As a consequence, investing is a time-
consuming task that is only rewarded when a minimum number of deals are closed
within a year.
The lack of a sufficient number of investment proposals may lead to a situation in
which too much money is chasing too few deals (Gompers, 1998). Under this scenario,
                                                
12 We also ran the fourth regression using GDP growth during the previous year instead of the current year, although
this new variable was not statistically significant.17
prices would rise since the deals are closed after auction-like negotiations. As a result,
many private equity investors would withdraw from this process, thus reducing their
expectations of meeting the objective of the investments committed by the end of the
year. Those who are behind in their investment objectives would be willing to offer
higher prices in order to close a deal, at the cost of lowering long term expected returns
to the investors. When this is not the case, investors would be unhappy to disburse
money just to cover management fees, which are calculated on the total amount of
capital they have committed to the fund. Under such conditions, it is unlikely that they
would consider participating in a new fund.
We can therefore conclude that, in a country where information about past returns
is scarce and/or unreliable, management teams who demonstrate fluent investment
activity can be expected to experience less trouble in seeking new funds in the near
future.
It should be noted that the deal flow in a given country largely depends on
macroeconomic and environmental variables. Some of these, like economic growth,
interest rates, labour market rigidities, accounting procedures and taxes on capital gains,
have already been considered in previous papers (Poterba, 1989; Gompers and Lerner,
1998; Jeng and Wells, 2000). Others, like unemployment rates and level of deregulation
in the economy, should also be considered.
The second variable to be described is the deterministic time trend, which also has a
strongly significant positive coefficient in the specifications in which it was included.
This variable reflects the growing trend in fundraising over time.
The most striking finding in this study is the negative coefficient on total amounts
divested in all of the specifications, ranging from –0.003 to –0.02427, which is
significant at a level of 5 percent in specifications 3 to 6. Since exiting is crucial to the
private equity investment process, a positive value was expected. There are two reasons,
however, that could explain such a negative value. First, data gathered in each yearly
survey of EVCA refers to the total amounts divested at cost, instead of the effective
amount obtained. An increase in the amount divested includes trade sales, which is the
main exit route in Europe, as well as IPOs, owner buy-backs, and written-off
investments, all valued at cost.
Figure 3 summarises the weighting of different exit ways in Europe, considered as a
whole. It is important to remark that trade sales were the main exit route, while IPOs
were the second, but only in the period 1993-1996. In 1991 and 1992, however, the
amounts written-off even surpassed the volume divested through IPOs, all valued at
cost. When the number of divestments are taken into account, write-offs stand ahead of
IPOs until 1997 (Figure 4).
The high percentage of written-off investments in Europe, in the early nineties, was
due to the closing of the first investment cycle of many management teams in most
countries. As already stated above, this period lasts for about 10 years and it is quite
common for management teams to suffer from the so-called “experience curve” in their
first fund experience.18
The variety of tasks to be developed when managing a private equity fund requires
a set of professional abilities13 that take some time to acquire. In addition to those
individual characteristics, success largely depends on the economic environment in
which the investment activity is developed. Even experienced managers coming from
other countries may fail in their initial fund when they face the constraints of the host
country. As time goes by, the number of investment managers with relevant experience
grows, reducing the failure rate. The lack of historical information14 in Europe does not
help to prove this hypothesis. Nevertheless, Figures 3 and 4 show a decreasing
weighting of written-off investments in the last decade of the century.
In the case of Spain, where there is more information available, the starting point
for most independent management teams was the period 1986-1988 (Martí, 1997-2000).
This period coincided with the entry of Spain to the European Union. As a result, those
managers had to compete with foreign industrial and financial investors who were
willing to pay high prices for Spanish companies in order to get a strategic position.
This situation affected the returns on their first funds quite negatively.
FIGURE 3
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF EXIT WAYS IN EUROPE
(% of amount divested)
40% 50% 60% 70%
                                                
13 Cold contacts, screening, negotiating, adding value and selling.
14 Data on divestments at cost in Europe has been made available since 1986, while the breakdown of different exit
ways has only been available since 1991.19
FIGURE 4
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF EXIT WAYS IN EUROPE
(% of number of divestments)
30,0% 40,0% 50,0% 60,0%
The amount of investments written-off at cost was included as an independent
variable in specifications 3 to 6 in order to explain the negative impact of divestments
on the dependent variable. The regressed coefficients ranged from –4.3 to –2.4, with
significance in all specifications that excluded the deterministic time trend. The
observed negative values met the expectations. This value is consistent with the
intuitive relationship between a bad performance signal and the attraction of new funds
into the industry.
The amounts divested through IPOs did not appear to have a statistically significant
impact under any of the assumed specifications. In some of them, the impact was
positive,   while   in   others   the   effect    on   fundraising   was    supposedly  negative.20
The explanation to this finding relies, again, on the nature of the available data. The
series of data refer to the amounts divested through IPOs plus the sale of quoted equity,
all valued at cost. Those coefficients would have been positive with market valuations.
Regardless of this issue, however, Figure 4 describes the limited importance of
IPOs as a means of exit in European countries. The weighting of management and
owner’s buy-back of the equity stakes held by private equity funds in portfolio
companies, is a clear indication of the difficulties that fund managers face when it
comes to exiting (Marti, 1999). Such difficulties are in the root of the withdrawal of
European investors from early-stage investments, since longer holding periods are
required, as there are no equity markets for growing companies. The development of
efficient equity markets for growth companies is crucial to the consolidation of the
venture capital and private equity industry. The new markets set up in several countries
since the mid-nineties are a positive milestone, but, so far, none of them is playing the
role that NASDAQ played, in the early days, in the United States.
As a general rule, the limited number of IPOs observed was generally associated
with large and mature companies who were large enough to attract the interest of
investors at official stock exchanges. The only exception to this rule were issues from
some technology start-ups at the German Neur Markt, or the French Nouveau Marché,
in the period from 1999 to April 2000 when the NASDAQ index started to decline.
In order to check the robustness of the results, we excluded all data from the United
Kingdom so as to control for possible biases in our estimations. The stage of
development of the private equity industry in this country is far away from the other
countries (as we saw in Figure 1), as it is the availability of data about returns.
We estimated the same six models as in Table 2. The Hausman test accepted the
null hypothesis of no correlation between the individual effects and the explanatory
variables in all the models except 3 and 4. Therefore, we estimated models 3 and 4
using the within groups estimator, which is the most efficient one in this case. The rest
of the models were estimated using the Balestra Nerlove estimator. The results are
shown in Table 3.
The results support even more our view. The coefficient on investments lagged one
period is statistically significant in all the specifications, and is larger than before. This
reinforces the idea that in countries where information about past returns is scarce,
investments is the most relevant variable when management teams are seeking to raise
new funds. There are no qualitative changes in all the other variables compared with the
results in table 2, which included all the countries. All the variables that are significant
have the same sign than in Table 2.21
TABLE 3
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
(Excluding data from the United Kingdom)



















(1)  INVit 0.895
* - - - - -
(8.42)
(2)  DIVit -0.006 - - - - -
(-0.66)
(3)  DIVIPOit 1.394
*** - - - - -
(1.646)






(9.50) (9.35) (9.37) (9.03) (9.01)






(-3.12) (-3.19) (-3.20) (-2.86) (-2.84)
(6)  DIVIPOit-1 - 0.235 0.113 0.099 -0.614 -0.663
(0.25) (0.11) (0.10) (-0.69) (-0.74)
(7)  DIVLIQit-1 - - -1.351 -1.594 -1.947 -2.064
(-0.64) (-0.74) (-1.06) (-1.11)
(8)  DGDPit - - - -2.508E-3 - -1.582E-3
(-0.78) (-0.62)









(2.19) (-1.33) (-1.89) (-0.81) (-3.61) (-2.93)
















GLS regression of 15 countries of the model 
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, with i denoting
country and t denoting year. The dependent variable is new funds raised. The independent variables are
(1) Total amount invested (2) Total amount divested (3) Total amount divested through IPOs (4), (5) and
(6) are the same as (1), (2) and (3) respectively, lagged one period (7) Total amount divested through
write-offs lagged one period (8) Growth in GDP from "t-1" to "t" (9) Deterministic time trend. All
regressors except T have been normalised by variable GDPit. t-statistics in parenthesis.
* = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, *** = significant at 10%
6.  CONCLUSIONS
The confidential nature of individual investments is a considerable constraint on
research into topics related to venture capital and private equity. Very limited
information about the activities of fund managers is available to private sources, and
then only once a year. The available information generally refers to individual22
investments and divestments, most of which are valued at cost, and are not available to
the general public. Data on returns are not always available either. In some cases, the
length of the investment cycle limits the number of funds fully divested, and interim
market valuations are not possible, since portfolios group unquoted companies. In other
cases, data is either not disclosed by fund managers, or the information provided is not
verified by independent third parties.
As a result, authors of papers that have dealt with venture capital activity, even in
countries like the United States, have had great difficulty in trying to find relevant
variables related to the topic for which the reliable data was available. They generally
focused on variables like GDP growth, capital gains tax, level of IPOs, labour market
rigidities, level of pension funds or market capitalisation growth. Models were
developed to try and find the key factors that lie behind supply and demand for venture
capital, but without taking into account variables that are more related to the venture
capital process.
This paper focuses on the ability of fund managers in a given country to raise more
money when they have a proven and satisfactory flow of investments in their record.
The very nature of the business, which requires a three-year period to invest all of a
fund’s committed capital, plus a 10-to-12-year period to fully divest the stakes held in
portfolio companies, forces investors in countries without reliable exit references to pay
more attention to prior objective data, i.e., the investing capabilities of fund managers.
This tendency is observed in European countries, where venture capital and private
equity is still developing, and information on returns is asymmetric and scarce. We have
found evidence that investments are very important in trying to explain the flow of new
funds raised. In all specifications, investments had a statistically significant positive
coefficient. In other words, the higher the amounts invested the easier fund managers
raise new funds. This indicates that the market considers the ability of fund managers to
wisely invest the total amounts that the investors have committed. This effect is even
more pronounced when data from the United Kingdom is excluded and when the
investments made during the previous year are taken into account. As was mentioned
earlier, this is consistent with the moment when the information is made available to the
market, i.e., in June of the following year.
This finding is also supported by recent data published on investments. The surge
of investments in Information Technologies and Communications since 1998 is the
main reason for the immense amounts raised by fund managers in 1999 and 2000. More
research should be conducted in the future about this topic.
In addition to the amounts invested, divestments valued at cost, amounts divested
through IPOs and write-offs, also valued at cost, plus GDP growth, are included as well.
Since information is gathered by EVCA once a year, most specifications lagged all
independent variables, except GDP growth, by one year. In order to reduce
heterogeneity among selected countries, all data was normalised by the GDP figure of
each year.
The coefficient on divestments was negative and significant in almost all of the
specifications. This result is surprising, as we generally expect divestments to be a good
signal for the market. This negative coefficient is explained by the coefficient on23
amounts divested through write-offs, which is also negative. We must remember that
the data refers to amounts divested at cost, and that there  was a high percentage of
written-off divestments in Europe at the beginning of the period analysed.
In summary, this paper found that variables related to the venture capital market,
like investments and divestments, are statistically related to new funds raised, which is
the major difference between previous studies and ours. This finding, however, is
compatible with conclusions found in other papers, since those models rely on variables
that are related to the deal flow. Nevertheless, fostering entrepreneurship not only
requires a good economic climate, low capital gains taxation, flexible labour markets
and so on, but also other variables that are not specifically included in those models.
One important conclusion for policy-makers in Europe, is that, in order to extend
venture capital activity, actions should be aimed at improving the deal flow. Another
conclusion that should interest venture capital/private equity managers, at the individual
level, is that fundraising is not only highly related to past performance, which is not
always available, but also to the ability of fund managers to access and close a sufficient
number of deals.
More research should be conducted on this issue, including data from IPOs with
market valuations. Another way of looking at the topic would probably be by analysing
this model in a given country, through a sample of private equity management teams.24
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